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AB HAND LUNGEN

&quot;Takings&quot; jurisprudence

in the U.S.

Supreme

Court: The Past 10 Years

Gregory S.Alexandee
I. Introduction

of American property law has been more controversial in rethe government regulation of uses of private property. No
than
years
constitutional law more sharply poses the dilemma
of
American
aspect
about the legitimate powers of the regulatory state than the requirement
No

area

cent

that the government pay compensation for takings of property. The purscholar who is
pose of this essay is to acquaint the non-American legal
States
United
the
in
unfamiliar with the recent developments
Supreme

The essay does not presuppose any
background knowledge about either American constitutional or property
law. Instead it attempts to familiarize those who are interested in comparative constitutional law with the major changes in this increasingly imporCourt&apos;s

&quot;takings&quot; jurisprudence.

area of American public law.
Several American commentators, particularly in the media, have argued
that the past decade has witnessed a &quot;revolution&quot; in American takings

tant

law.1 This essay will argue that while

takings doctrine,

it is

vastly

significant changes

premature

to

have occurred in

conclude that these

changes

Professor of Law, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. This essay was delivered at a
seminar of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
Heidelberg, Germany, while the author was a Visiting Fellow there. He wishes to thank the
staff of the Max Planck Institute, particularly co-director, Prof. Dr. Jochen F r o w e 1 n, for
*

their

extraordinary hospitality

and intellectual stimulation.

See the newspaper articles cited in William W F i s h e r I 11, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774, 1774 nn. 2-3 (1988).
I
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amount to

anything

like

a

doctrinal revolution. Too much of the

preexist-

doctrinal structure remains intact, and too many important questions
remain unresolved to warrant such a conclusion. A more balanced char-

ing

acterization

of the

current state

of

takings jurisprudence in the
increasingly contentious.

U.S. Su-

preme Court is that it is unsettled and

H.

Before

surveying

sketch the
was

Background.,

state

the

The Pre-1987 Doctrinal

recent

developments,

of constitutional doctrine

the year in which the

Supreme

as

Landscape

it will be useful first

it stood

Court decided

a

prior

to

to

1987. That

quartet of cases that

initiated the so-called

takings revolution.2 To evaluate whether the recent
decisions truly constitute a change of such proportions, we need first to
be clear about what preceded them.
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is a complex and multifaceted provision. With respect to constitutional protection of property,
its text is beguilingly simple. It merely states that the government (both
federal and state) shall not &quot;take property&quot; for &quot;public use&quot; without paying &quot;just compensation.&quot; That simple text obscures the hard questions.
Thos e questions are: (1) What actions by the government constitute &quot;takings&quot; of property? (2) What interests count as &quot;property&quot; for constitutional purposes? (3) What uses of property are &quot;public&quot; uses? (4) What
does the requirement of &quot;just&quot; compensation require? Of these four questions, the

most

intractable have been the first

two.

While the second

have been less controversial and

unimportant, they
ily described. Let us begin with these relatively simpler
fore proceeding to the more complex questions.
are not

A. The Public-Use

Under the Fifth
power of

Amendment, the
domain

two

are more eas-

matters,

then, be-

Requirement

state

may

legitimately

exercise

its

with

person&apos;s property,
expropriate
payment of compensation, only if it does so for some public purpose. A
compensated condemnation of property for private purposes is unconstieminent

to

a

even

tutional.

2

The cases are Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); First English Evangelical Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 30 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); and Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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Court

requirement in fact restrict the state&apos;s

public-use

power? The short answer is &quot;very little.&quot; As one commentator has noted, &quot;[M]ost observers today think the public use limitation is a dead letter.&quot;3 The most recent Supreme Court decision on this requirement indicates why this is so. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mideminent domain

k iff 4 the Court

upheld

of five

Hawaii

a

that authorized

statute

tenants

condemn their landlords&apos;

in

developments
ship interest and thereby acquire full ownership themselveS.5 The Court
specifically concluded that the statute satisfied the public-use requirement, reasoning that the statute was aimed at &quot;[rlegulating oligopoly and
or more to

acres

the evils associated with It.,,6 The

test

that the Court used

owner-

provides little,

if any, basis for invalidating condemnations on public-use grounds.
&quot;[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose,&quot; justice O&apos;Connor wrote, &quot;the
Court has

never

lic Use Clause.
and

ing

least

at

held

,7

a

compensated taking

While academic

theories of the

plausible

to

be

commentators

the Pub-

proscribed by
have

proposed

interest-

public-use requirement

that

little prospect that the Court will
future. Consequently, one can
the
in
of
theories
these
near
adopt any
this
requirement.
largely ignore

would add

some

teeth

to

it,8

Turning

to

sation. It

seems

&quot;Just Compensation&quot;

B.

has held that

there

the requirement of just compensation, the Supreme Court
&quot;just&quot; compensation does not necessarily mean full compen-

means

that the

owner

is entitled

to

the full market value of the

property interest which has been taken from him, not the value that he
taches to it. Judge Posner recently explained the difference:

by payment of market
is therefore not full compenthe value that every owner of property attaches

U]ust compensation has been held
value

Compensation

to

his property but

to

be satisfied

in the constitutional

sation, for market value is

not

merely

at-

sense

the value that the

marginal

owner

attaches

to

his

property.9
i 11, The Economics of Public Use,
(1984).
516-23 (1976).
Haw. Rev. Stat. secs. 516-22
467 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).

3

Thomas M

4

467 U.S.229

5

e r r

62 Cornell L. Rev. 61

(1986).

-

6
7

Id.

11

See

9

at

241.

Merrill,
Coniston Corp

note 3.
v.

Village ofHoffman Estates,

844f.2d 461, 464

(7th

Cir.

1988).
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The

reason

that the Court has given for confining compensation to
personal value is that personal valuation

market value rather than full

insuperable &quot;practical difficulties. &quot;l 0 Commentators have
proposed various methods of dealing with these practical problems,&apos; 1 but,
as with the public-use requirement, there seems little likelihood that the
Court will change its view anytime in the near future.
would

create

C. Has

We come,

then,

to

the

&quot;Property&quot;
two

questions

Been &quot;Taken&quot;?

that

are at

the heart of the

current

takings doctrine, what interests constitute property for
controversy
constitutional purposes, and what governmental acts constitute takings.
over

The

current

Court has tended

to

collapse

the distinction between these

questions, although, as we will see, it is increasingly important to
them analytically distinct.
In the regulatory state determining whether the government has taken
some
private property without paying compensation becomes most
acutely difficult and most politically charged in the context of those governmental acts that formally are mere regulations of property use, that is,
actions that are purportedly exercises of the state&apos;s so-called &quot;police
power,&quot; for which no compensation is required, rather than its power of
eminent domain, which does require compensatio,n. If the line between
compensable takings and non-compensable regulations was drawn strictly
two

keep

on

the basis of the formal character of the government action, of course,
protection under the Just Compensation Clause of

there would be little

the Fifth Amendment. The

state could nearly always avoid the compensamerely by characterizing its action as a regulation rather
than an expropriation. For the Fifth Amendment to have any teeth, there
has to be some recognition of the fact that some acts that formally are
mere regulations in fact are expropriations. American constitutional law
reflects this awareness in the crucial doctrine known as the &quot;regulatory
taking.&quot; It is no exaggeration to say that the American law of takings today has become virtually synonymous with &quot;regulatory takings.&quot;

tion requirement

10

United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
See, e.g., Merrill, note 3, 82-85, 90-92; Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi.L. Rev.
681, 736-737 (1973).
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recognize the regulatory taking doctrine was the famous case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,12 decided in 1922. In that
case, justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated that a purported exercise of the state&apos;s police power becomes a taking when it &quot;goes too far.&quot;
Since that case, the Court has not made much headway in specifying the
parameters of regulatory takings, but it has made so me progress.
Until 1987, there were two, but only two, categories of regulations that
triggered rules of per se unconstitutional takings. These were the &quot;permanent physical occupation&quot; and the &quot;nuisance -abatement&quot; categories.
Under the first rule, a per se taking occurs whenever a regulation authorizes the state or someone acting under the state&apos;s authority to occupy
the owner&apos;s property physically and permanently. That this rule is a true
will be found in such sitper se rule is indicated by the fact that a taking
of
uations regardless of how slight the degree
occupation, trivial the effect
of the owner, or how important the need for the occupation. In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,13 the Supreme Court, speaking
through justice Thurgood Marshall, stated that the per se rule was quite
narrow. Until recently, it has been. To trigger the per se rule, the occupation must be direct and it must be permanent. This is why, for example,
in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,14 no per se taking was found
when a state law required owners of private shopping centers to allow
members of the public to enter their shopping centers for purposes of distributing leaflets. The state-authorized occupation, although direct and
physical, was only temporary, the Court reasoned. The effect of the three
requirements that the occupation be direct, physical, and permanent was
to make the scope of this per se rule exceedingly narrow.
The other per se rule is one of per se validity, rather than invalidity.
This rule concerns regulations that are designed to prevent a public nuisance. Under this rule, government actions that abate a public nuisance are
never held to be takings. The theory is that the range of legally-protected
behavior that private ownership confers on individuals does not include
The first

the power

case to

to

harm the

havior, then, it does

12

260 U.S. 393

13

458 U.S. 419

not

public.15

When the

take any property

state acts to

right

that the

prevent such beowner had in the

(1922).
(1982).
14
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
15
See, e.g., Miller v. Scboene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacbeck v. Sebastian,
(1915); just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).

239 U.S. 394
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place. The problem with this rule, of course, as several commentators
pointed oUt,16 is that public-harm prevention and public-benefit
conferring (to which the per se rule of validity does not apply) are two
sides of the same coin. Every regulation that prevents a harm to the public by definition confers a benefit on the public. The characterization of a
regulation as &quot;harm-preventing,&quot; then, is a conclusion, not a reason. Until recently, the Court has never explained how this distinction can be
drawn in a principled way.
As to all other regulatory actions, the Court has used a very different
method of analysis. Eschewing per se rules, the Court has engaged in a
process of reasoning that it has itself characterized as one of &quot;essentially
ad hoc factual inquir[y].-17 While ad hoc, however, the Court&apos;s analysis
has not been entirely formless. It has focused on three factors: (1) the
character of the governmental action; (2) the extent to which the regulafirst

have

tion interferes with what the Court calls &quot;distinct investment-backed

pectations&quot;;

and (3) the

degree

1. The Character

Joseph

S i n g e r has

ex-

of diminution in value.

of the

succinctly

and

Governmental Action

aptly explained

the first factor. &quot;The

&apos;character of the government action,&apos;&quot; S i n g e r states, &quot;concerns the issue
of whether the regulation is more closely analogous to a physical invasion

right [on the one hand] or [on the other
hand] to a general regulatory program affecting numerous parcels and designed to protect the public from harm by adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.-18 There was some
indication in the Court&apos;s opinion in the 1978 case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York that the harmful character of the conduct that the regulation proscribes is no longer important, or at least that
it is less important than it once was. As we shall see, however, that has
turned out to be a false signal.
or

seizure of

16

a

core

property

The classic discussion of the

and Fairness: Comments

on

Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1196-1197
17

Penn Central

18

Joseph

problem

is Frank 1.

Michelman, Property, Utility,

the Ethical Foundations of &quot;Just

Compensation&quot; Law,

80

(1972).

TransportatiOn Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
r, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices (Boston,

William S i n g e

1993),1228.
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Court

Expectations&quot;

expectations,&quot; as well as the
developed by Frank Mientitled
article
celebrated
1967
&quot;Property, Utility,
justly
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of &apos;Just Compensation&apos; Law.&quot;19 The basic idea that the phrase is intended to suggest is that
the owner&apos;s reliance interest merits particular attention. A taking is more
likely to be found where the regulation interferes with an investment that
the owner had already made in reliance on a preexisting regulatory regime, rather than frustrating some future, yet uncrystallized plan or investment opportunity that the owner had contemplated. This factor has
not appeared in the Supreme Court&apos;s analysis before the Court recognized
it in the Penn Central case, but since then it has played a prominent role.20
The

phrase,

&quot;distinct investment-backed

concept that the
chelman in his

phrase described,

3. Diminution

The third factor

to

were

in

first

Market Value

paid attention in its, balancing
regulation resulted in a diminution in

which the Court has
which the

analysis is the extent to
the market value of the owner&apos;s property interest. The idea here, of
course, is that if a regulation effects a substantial diminution in value, it
will be treated

as

a

de facto

expropriation.

Two

problems

have

plagued

this factor from the time when the Court first introduced it in the 1922

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mabon decision. The first problem is determining the relevant property interest that is the basis for calculating the dethe market
gree of diminution. The test requires that the Court compare
remaining property interest in
of diminution. But what is
fraction
the
determine
or
to
percentage
the relevant denominator of the fraction? Is it the entire bundle of rights
value of that interest with the value of the
order

that discrete interest that the regulation has affected? If the former is chosen, then the degree of diminution
will usually be less. If it is the latter, then the degree of diminution may
that the

owner

initially

held

or

only

approach one hundred percent. The second problem with this factor is
degree of diminution is too much. How does one determine in a

what

19

See

note

16 supra.

See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 U.S.211 (1986); Ruckelsbaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979).
20
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principled way at what point diminution in market value becomes constitutionally impermissible?
Until quite recently, neither of these factors has been terribly important.

The Court determined in the Penn Coal

nominator is the entire bundle of

that the

rights

case

in the

that the relevant de-

legally-recognized

estate

held. The consequence was that while regulations might
considerable diminution in value in some instances, in no in-

owner

produce
stance

did it

Court

to

approach one hundred percent. This has made it easier for the
finding a taking on the basis of this factor alone. Between
1922 and 1991, the Supreme Court had never found that a regulation constituted a taking solely on the basis of the degree of diminution in value.
As we shall shortly see, that history ended with the Court&apos;s 1992 decision
in Lucas

avoid

South Carolina Coastal Commission.21

v.

111. 1987

The

Big

although,

Picture

as

began

to

-

a

Takings

change

I will argue, there is

Revolution?

with the

reason to

Supreme

doubt that

Court&apos;s 1987
a

Term,

&quot;revolution&quot; had

occurred in

takings jurisprudence. Three major doctrinal developments in
Supreme Court&apos;s post-1987 takings jurisprudence warrant special attention. These are (1) the rise of conceptual severance; (2) the broadening
of the physical occupation factor; and (3) the emergence of a new per se
the

rule in Lucas

v.

South Carolina Coastal Commission.

A. The Rise of

&quot;Conceptual severance,&quot;
d i n,22 refers

ship

to

a

Conceptual

term

first coined

the idea that each incident

in the bundle of

by Margaret Jane

or set

itself constitutes

Ra-

of incidents of owner-

fully protectable property
accepted,
obviously
enormously broaden the
reach of the takings clause. Conceivably, e v e r y regulation which does
not fit into a properly defined nuisance exception could be viewed as a
taking under this theory.23
interest. If

rights

Severance

this idea

21

112 S. Ct. 2886

22

Margaret Jane

a

would

(1992).

Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1676 (1988).
23
Indeed, this is the gist of the argument put forward in Richard A. E p s t e 1 n, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, MA 1985).

jurisprudence

R a d i n, The Liberal

of

http://www.zaoerv.de
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Earlier decisions of the

ceptual
of

ture

severance.

24

Supreme

The 1987 Term

conceptual severance.

Supreme

Court had pretty
cases sent mixed

On the

one

865

Court

clearly rejected consignals about the fu-

hand, Keystone Bituminous Coal

Association v. DeBenediCtiS25 seemed squarely to reject the idea. Quoting
from its earlier decision in Andrus v. Allard, the Court stated: &quot;[W]here
of
an owner possesses a full &apos;bundle&apos; of property rights, the destruction

strand of the &apos;bundle&apos; is

one

because the aggregate

taking

not a

must

be

entirety.&quot;26

viewed in its

On the other

hand,

two

other decisions from the

same

Term indicated

prepared to apply the conceptual severance
Hodel
In
v.
I-rving,27 the Court struck down a federal statute
technique.
which. provided that upon the death of the owner of an excessively fractionated undivided ownership share in tribal Indian lands allotted to indithat the Court

viduals, the

indeed

was

interest shall

pass either

not

the deceased owner&apos;s devisees

to

the tribe whose land it

to
originally
Characterizing the statute as a total restriction on the power to
control the disposition of property at death, the Court ruled that it constituted an uncompensated, and therefore unconstitutional, taking of
property. The right to pass on property at death, the Court said, is among
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly charor

heirs but instead shall escheat

was.28

acterized

as

property.&quot;29

The other

case

technique

severance

employed a form of the conceptual
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.

in which the Court
is First

County of Los Angeles.30 There

the Court held that

a

landowner

was en-

titled to damages in an inverse condemnation action when an ordinance
temporarily deprived the owner of all economically viable use. The ordinance, while not stating any durational limit, was rescinded after it was ju-

dicially

declared

the Court

24

25

not

v.

480 U.S. 470

Id.

27

481 U.S. 704

28

The purpose of this

dian land

owner

444 U.S. 51

of

its

Penn Central

(1979);

497,

quoting Andrus

Transp.

Co.

v.

City of

v.

Allard,

444 U.S.

65 -66.

facilitate prudent leasing and management of Insmall fractionated interests. Without such reconsoli-

statute was to

by reconsolidating multiple

coordination

at

(1987).

dation, Congress felt, efficient management and

by

taking. The rescission,
right to recover damages

unconstitutional

the

438 U.S. 104

26

at

an

deprive

Allard,
(1978).
(1987).

See, e.g., Andrus

York,

New

constitute

to

held, did

use

of the land would

likely

be frustrated

problems.

29

107 S. Ct at 2083.

30

482 U.S. 304

(1&quot;7).
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for the

of time when the ordinance

was in effect. Temporary takRehnquist reasoned, have the same status as permanent
ones because for the period in question it i s permanent. This is t e m
po
r a 1, or durational, as distinguished from f u n c t i o n a I conceptual severance. The bundle of rights is sliced into temporal shares, each of which is
Michelman has pointed out, this &quot;estaa whole &quot;thing.&quot; As Frank
beachhead
in takings jurisprudence for conceptual
blishe[s] a major new
severance.&quot;31 It does not take a great deal of effort to imagine the same
technique divided into discrete segment ownership interests that are formally undivided being* used to extend the functional version of conceptual severance much more broadly than the Court did in Hodel v. Irving,
in effect repudiating its disavowal of conceptual severance in both Penn
Central and in a case decided the same Term as First English, Keystone Bi-

ings,

period

Chief Justice

-

-

-

turninous Coal Association

v.

DeBenedictis.32 The Court has

not

yet taken

that step, and perhaps it will not do so. It could fairly
First English from the more typical situation by relying
tion that M i c h e I
was

crucial

to

fected

a

total

has offered.

the decision in First

enacted, had

as

in a n

an

taking

According to
English was the fact

indefinite duration
without any offer

the part of government,&quot; M i c h e I m
constitutional and lawless.1134
on

Nonetheless,

I do

not

easily distinguish
on an interpretaM i c h e I in a n,33 what

think that

we

that the ordinance,
and, therefore, w o u I d have efof compensation. &quot;Such behavior
a n

states, &quot;is

ought

to

(by hypothesis)

dismiss

out

un-

of hand any

likelihood that the present Court will extend its use of conceptual severance. As Michelman
emphasized, the majority in First English included justice Brennan, the author of three opinions that explicitly re-

jected conceptual
the

the

majority opinions in Penn Central and
concurring opinion in Hodel v. Irving affirming
continued vitality of Andrus. The majority also included justices

Andrus

v.

severance

Allard and

-

a

White, Blackmun, and Marshall, all of whom had joined

Brennan in Penn

Central and Andrus. None of those four

justices is on the present Court,
and at least some of their replacements
justice Thomas leaps most
mind
well
be
to
more
quickly
favorably disposed to extending the
may
reach of conceptual severance. At least three members of the Court now
can probably be counted as firm conceptual severance
supporters: Chief
-

-

31

Frank M i c h e I

32

480

33
34

m a n, Takings 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1617-1618 (1988).
U.S.470, 496-498 (1987).
Michelman, note 31, 1619-1621.

Id.

at

1619.
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. justice O&apos;Connor used
it in Irving and might be inclined to apply it again under the right circumstances. That leaves us just one short of a conceptual severance majority.
Stay tuned.
The Broadened

B.

Physical Occupation

Factor:

The Nollan-Dolan Doctrine

The second

major post-1987 development

concerns

the

physical

occu-

indipation factor. Since 1987, the Supreme Court has sent several signals
the
somewhat
be
it
that
to
physicalexpand
occupaprepared
cating
may
tion category of regulatory takings. The most important of these signals is
the

of the Nollan-Dolan doctrine.
concerns a practice that has been

development

The doctrine

quite

common

Exactions

the country in recent years -exactions.
extract from landowners who wish

throughout

in cities

are conces-

change the use of
their land in some way and are required to obtain the city&apos;s permission to
do so. The typical scenario involves an application for a development permit which the city conditions on the landowner&apos;s agreeing to dedicate a
portion of her land to some public use. The ostensible purpose of the exaction to minimize the negative externalities of the proposed development.35 Clearly, though, their increased popularity reflects the fact that
sions that cities

few cities

today

can

afford

to

pay for

public

to

dedications of

private

land.

v. California Coastal Commission,36 the Court for the first
time imposed a requirement that there be an &quot;essential nexus&quot; between
the purpose of an exaction and the purpose that would be served by de-

In Nollan

nying the requested development permit. Then, 1994, the Court in Dolan
City of Tigard37 added to this doctrine the further requirement that a

v.

rough proportionality&quot; exist between the exaction and the expected impact of the proposed development. The city, moreover, is assigned the
burden of proving that this proportionality exists.
These two requirements have cast doubt on the viability of exactions
generally. Commentators have suggested that the doctrine will be means
11

to the Nollan-Dolan doctrine, see DougRy a n, Paying for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1801 (1995); Stewart E. Sterk,
Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1731 (1988).
35

On

las T K e

exactions, both generally and in relation
n

d

a

I I / E.

36

483 U.S.825
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114 S.Ct. 2309

(1987).
(1994).
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for

Alexander

constitutionalizing

ments

ing

and landowners

the

flexibility

a wide variety of disputes between local governconcerning land development38 and severely limit-

of local governments

to

regulate

land

use

in the

public

interest.

All of this may yet come to pass, but there are
new doctrine is more limited. Both

reach of the

that authorized the

had

had

public

to enter

private land

reasons to
cases

over

think that the

involved exactions
which the

owners

right to exclude. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission required the owners of beachfront property to
permit the public to cross laterally across their private stretch of beach, located between two state parks. The requirement in effect exacted a public
easement of way, an action that if done directly clearly would have required compensation. In Dolan, the city conditioned a permit to expand
the owner&apos;s store and parking lot on dedicating a portion of the land to
the city for the purposes of creating a pedestrian and bicycle path and a

previously

an

unlimited

flood control greenway. As in Nollan, the exaction would have had the effect of restricting the owner&apos;s power to exclude the public from her land.
Both decisions, then, reflect, as Frank M i c h e I m a n stated with respect

Nollan, &quot;the talismanic force of &apos;permanent physical occupation&apos; in
takings adjudication. -39 To date, there has been no indication that the
Court would apply the same heightened scrutiny where the government
condition does not interfere with the landowner&apos;s right to exclude.40
Further evidence that the Court seems not prepared to launch a massive
expansion of the physical occupation category, subject to a rigid per se
rule, is its decision in Yee v. City of Escondito.41 That case involved a mobile home rent control ordinance. California state law restricts the ability
of owners of mobile home parks to order, while the rental agreement is
to

still in

effect,

the removal of

effect of that law with

a

a

mobile home upon its sale. The combined
rent control ordinance, the park owner

local

argued, was to constitute a taking by physical occupation. The Supreme
Court disagreed, emphasizing that there was no &quot;compelled physical occupation&quot; here. It is, the Court stated, the &apos;element of required acquies-

38
See Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal Constitution, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 992, 992-993 (1989).
39 Michel man, note 31, 1608.
40
See Eric T. F r e y f o g I e, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L.

Rev. 77, 87 N.41
41

(1995).
(1992).

112 S. Ct. 1522
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the heart of the concept of occupation.&quot;42 The exactions
were both of the type that could easily be
&quot;required acquiescence&quot; of just that sort, but many other mu-

[that]

cence

in the U.S.

is

at

involved in Nollan and Dolan
viewed

as

nicipal

exactions

doctrine will put

C.

It

cannot.
an

end

to

unlikely, then, that
practice.

seems

that

Categorical

Another

of):
Deprivations

Rule (Sort

Lucas and Total Economic

The final

development

tion. It may also be the

is

one

one

the Nollan-Dolan

that has received the greatest public attenpractical effect. In Lucas v.

that has the least

Soutb Carolina Coastal Commission, 43 the Court concluded that environmental regulations that deprive the landowner of all economically viable
use are

per

se

takings unless

the intended

use

constituted

a

public

nuisance

under what the Court called &quot;relevant background principles.&quot; Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia stated: &quot;Where the State seeks to sustain
that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think

regulations

it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner&apos;s estate shows that the proscribed. use interests
the state, to
were not part of his title to begin with.&quot;44 In other words,

avoid

a

compensation obligation,
in the historical

existing

must

common

locate

some

land-use

prohibitions

law of nuisance and link that prothe challenged regulation.

proscribed by
problems with Justice Scalia&apos;s analysis, as several
have
commentators
effectively pointed oUt.45 The point that I wish to emthat
Lucas&apos; categorical rule may not amount to all that
here
is
phasize
if
confined
it is
much
to the unusual circumstance of a judicial finding of
fact that the regulation deprived the owner of a I I economically viable use
and if the Court does not broaden that circumstance through a more extensive use of the conceptual severance technique. The real significance of
Lucas may be less its practical effect that the signal it sends regarding the
current Court&apos;s desire to remold takings law along more formal lines. The
Rehnquist Court seems increasingly impatient with the open-ended balhibition with the
There

are

a

42

Id.

43

112 S.Ct. 2886

44

112 S. Ct.

at

use

host of

1528.

at

(1992).
(footnote omitted).

2899

For trenchant criticisms of Lucas, see Freyfogle, note 40, 118-127; William W.
h e r I I I, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1993); John A. H u in b a c h,
Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1993).
45
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ancing approach of Penn Central. Lucas and Dolan
Court is responding positively to calls from some

good

may indicate that the
for &quot;a

commentators

dose of formalization. &quot;46

Conclusion
Is it fair

stituting

a

to

characterize the Court&apos;s

&quot;revolution&quot;

in

post-1987 takings

takings jurisprudence?

decisions

I think

not.

as con-

The basic

and substance of the doctrine have remained

largely intact. But
clearly things are changing. Structurally, the doctrine is increasingly becoming formalized. Substantively, the new formality has enhanced the
takings clause&apos;s role in restricting the power of state and local governments. Once a backwater of constitutional law, the takings clause has
emerged as one of the Rehnquist Court&apos;s main tools for constructing the
minimal state. No one interested in American public law can afford any
longer to ignore it.
structure
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Hockery, 88,

Colum. L. Rev. 1697, 1700

(1988).
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